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The Long-Term Effect of Economic Value Added  
Adoption on the Firm’s Business Decision 
 
Abstract 
We examine the long-term effects of adopting economic value added (EVA) as a 
compensation tool on managers’ behaviour. We extend the sample used in prior studies both 
in the time and the cross section dimensions. Our conclusions are distinct from those offered 
by existing studies. We show that EVA adopters, relative to non-EVA adopters, increase the 
working capital cycle, use their assets less intensively, and decrease their payouts to 
shareholders via a decrease in dividends and share repurchases. In investing decisions, we 
find a decrease in new investments, but no change in asset dispositions after the adoption of 
EVA compensation plans. Our results highlight that the EVA adoption provides more 
incentives to reduce the total cost for capital rather than increasing operations and maximising 
shareholder wealth. 
Keywords: economic value added; residual income; business decision. 
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The Long-Term Effect of Economic Value Added  
Adoption on the Firm’s Business Decision 
 
1. Introduction 
The agency problem has long been recognised as one of the major issues in management and 
finance. A rational manager maximises his own utility, and cares about the shareholders’ 
interest only as long as his interest and theirs coincide. Thus, aligning those potentially 
conflicting interests has been subject to considerable debate. 
The expected role of the executive manager is to maximize the firm’s value (Wallace, 1997) 
and, hence, shareholder wealth. This maximisation is achieved through optimal management 
decisions; particularly investment, financing, and operating decisions. Traditionally, 
shareholders try to achieve this through managerial ownership. However, theoretical and 
empirical arguments show that share ownership can have both an alignment and entrenchment 
effects (Khan and Mather, 2013). The quality and independence of remuneration committees 
have also been argued to help align executive compensation with firm financial performance 
(Cybinski and Windsor, 2013; Gray and Nowland, in press). 
One principle that has long been recognised is that, in order for a company to create value and 
to generate wealth, a firm must earn a rate greater than its cost of capital (Drucker, 1995). 
This is historically referred to as residual income (henceforth RI). One variant of RI is the 
economic value added (EVA) introduced by Stern Stewart & Co., US-based consulting firm, 
in 1991 as an alternative performance measurement to traditional earnings and cash flows 
based metrics.  EVA is similar to RI but includes additional adjustments to accounting values 
suggested by Stern Stewart (Stewart, 1991; Stern et al., 1995). However, EVA has been 
criticised as simply “re-labelling the resultant residual income concept” (O’Hanlon & 
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Peasnell, 1998, p.425). According to O’Hanlon and Peasnell (1998), the adjustments are 
based on consulting experiences that are not clearly underpinned by a theoretical framework. 
Although 120 aspects of conventional GAAP are identified to adjust the financial accounts for 
EVA, the basic adjustments include the capitalization of all intangible investments, such as 
goodwill and research and development expenditure, and general provision for bad debts and 
inventory obsolescence (Stewart, 1991; O’Hanlon & Peasnell, 1998).  
The economic value added (EVA) metric has received considerable attention in the literature 
as the best performance measure with the ability to align managers’ interests with those of the 
shareholders (Wallace, 1997; Balachandran, 2006).  
In a seminal paper, Wallace (1997) investigated whether the use of residual income bonus 
plans led to the making of decisions consistent with the economic incentives embedded in 
those plans. He concluded that, with regard to operating decisions, executive managers of a 
firm adopting the residual income method as a compensation metric will make decisions that 
would increase assets disposition and decrease new investments.  
While our aim is similar, we extend Wallace’s (1997) work in three distinct directions. First, 
we modify the statistical model to directly control for the firms that did not adopt EVA. 
Second, we extend the time horizon of study to cover the period from 1981 to 2012.  More 
importantly, the number of sample firms is more than double that of Wallace (1997). 
Extending the sample in both the time and the cross section dimensions will remove doubt 
that previous results may have been due to data limitations. Third, we focus exclusively on 
EVA adopters, while Wallace (1997) uses a mixture of EVA and RI adopters. We therefore 
remove the possibility that results may be contaminated by the presence of RI adopters. 
Contrary to Wallace’s (1997) findings, our paper argues that relative to non-EVA adopters, 
EVA adopters decrease their payouts to shareholders, increase the working capital cycle and 
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use their assets less intensively. We also examine the firm’s investment policies through asset 
dispositions and new investments. Our results confirm Wallace’s (1997) finding that EVA 
adopters decreased their new investments after the adoption of an EVA performance measure. 
However, we find no relationship between asset dispositions and an EVA-based executive 
compensation plan. Overall, our research indicates that EVA adopters tend to utilise more net 
working capital, but are more reluctant to use free cash flows for dividend payouts, 
repurchases and capital expenditure relative to non-EVA adopters. As a result of our findings, 
we can say that following the adoption of EVA, the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers may take place again. This is more likely due to managers’ own utility 
maximisation through incentive compensation plans rather than shareholders’ value by 
reducing share repurchases and dividend payouts. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 offers a review of the existing literature. 
Section 3 describes the data sources, sample selection, and variable definitions. Section 4 
describes the methodology, and Section 5 discusses the empirical results. The final section 
summarises the results and offers some concluding remarks.  
2. Literature Review 
The vast majority of the existing research has examined whether the adoption of EVA 
incentive compensation plan has any impact on managers’ investment behaviour (Wallace, 
1997; Kleiman, 1999; Balachandran, 2006). All of this empirical research has the common 
assumption that the adoption of the EVA compensation system will rationalize a firm’s 
investment decision and will lead to it using the existing assets more efficiently to generate 
more residual income and, hence, to maximize shareholders’ wealth as well.   
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One major strand in the EVA literature focuses on the usefulness of EVA in explaining the 
variation of stock price performance. Biddle et al. (1997) find that EVA actually has poorer 
explanatory power of US stock return than other simpler performance metrics. Worthington 
and West (2004), in their study of Australian firms, reached different conclusions, arguing 
that the divergence may be at least partly explained by the difference between the US and 
Australian accounting systems. 
In this paper, we focus on manager and firm behaviour as a result of adopting EVA as a 
reward system. Pham et al. (2011) investigated the impact of EVA on firms’ corporate 
governance using a sample of 136 Australian listed firms. Chiwamit et al. (2017) discussed 
the mediating role of regulators imposing EVA to support the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises in Thailand.  McLaren et al. (2016) presented a case study and discussed the 
reasons for the implementation, evolution and abandonment of EVA based on three firms in 
New Zealand. However, the most important study in this field is Wallace (1997). The study 
focuses on the firm’s behaviour directly by looking at changes in a number of accounting 
fundamentals following the adoption of value added measures. Similar work has been carried 
out by Kleiman (1999) and Balachandran (2006). Wallace (1997) compared a group of forty 
companies adopting RI and EVA as compensation plans with the same number of carefully 
matched control firms. He examined the impact of the adoption of RI-based compensation on 
investing, finance and operating decisions within the three-year post-adoption period 
compared to the five-year pre-adoption period. 
Kleiman (1999) extended the sample to 71 US firms adopting EVA as an incentive 
compensation system. One important finding is that firms monitor their working capital 
regardless of the compensation plan they adopt. Kleiman (1999) also fails to confirm some of 
Wallace’s conclusions. Balachandran (2006) investigated whether switching from traditional 
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accounting-based performance plans to an RI-based compensation incentive would affect the 
investment motive. His results show strong support for the view that RI-adopting firms do 
actually deliver higher RI after adoption. However, the results also show no significant 
change in investment pattern.  
In their study of how managers perform under an EVA bonus scheme, Riceman et al. (2002), 
examine whether the managers who are compensated using EVA-based bonus plans 
outperform the managers who are compensated on traditional accounting-based bonus plans. 
This system, they claim, can change managerial behaviour at the firm level. Riceman et al. 
(2002) contend that ‘one reason to expect better performance for managers on EVA bonus 
plans is that an EVA-based reward system better aligns the interests of the manager and the 
firm’ (p.543). 
Riceman et al. (2002) used a sample of 117 managers in major international New Zealand 
companies, focusing on whether the relationship between the compensation type and 
performance depends on the understanding of EVA. Their results show a positive and 
dramatic effect of EVA understanding on the performance of EVA-adopting managers. An 
important finding by Riceman et al. (2002) is that EVA understanding is not always high. 
  
3. Research Design and Methodology 
EVA is defined as the profit earned by the firm less the cost of financing the firm’s capital. It 
is similar to RI but adjusted for net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and invested capital 
where needed. It is also referred to as net operating profit less a charge for the opportunity 
cost of invested capital (Worthington & West, 2001). 
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Residual income (RI) is defined as follows (Biddle et al., 1997): 
  RI = NOPAT – ( ×WACC)                                                          
where NOPAT is net operating profit after tax,   is lagged book value of net assets, and  
WACC is the company’s weighted average cost of capital. This basic formula in fact 
represents the value created in excess of the required return to the company's shareholders. 
Economic value added (EVA) is obtained by making a number of adjustments to NOPAT and 
the invested capital () (Stewart, 1991). Additional details on EVA components can be 
found in Worthington and West (2004).  
 
3.1. Data   
Our sample consists of US firms that have chosen to adopt the EVA compensation system. 
Consistent with Wallace (1997) and Kleiman (1999), the first year of the company 
announcing its adoption of EVA is defined as the event year. Since it can take several months 
for the company to fully adopt EVA, we follow standard practice and consider the month of 
December of that year as the event date ( = 0).1 We started initially with Wallace’s (1997) 
23 firms that adopted the EVA compensation plan. This list of adopter firms was then updated 
by Kleiman (1999) and the number of EVA adopter was increased to 71 firms. Then, we 
began our search using various databases where the EVA-implementing firms may be 
identified. These comprise the Stern Stewart & Co. brochure, Lexis-Nexis, the Proxy 
Statement, the 10-Q report and the Wall Street Journal. The majority of firms which adopted 
                                                            
1
 This approach is also adopted by Wallace (1997), Kleiman (1999), and Balachandran (2006). 
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EVA disclose such information in their official releases. For example, RR Donnelley & Sons 
Co. states in its 10-Q report: 
“Over the past three years, the company has adopted the principles of Economic 
Value Added (EVA) as its primary financial framework. The objective of this system 
is to put in place a system of value-based metrics that measures periodic progress 
toward improved shareholder value creation. To enhance value … 
Over time, the application of the EVA financial framework to the company's 
decision-making process is likely to produce slower revenue growth, enhanced free 
cash flow, a stronger competitive position and improved return on invested 
capital”
2
. 
We identify an initial list of 101 firms adopting EVA in the period 1987-2001; these represent 
different US market sectors. A total of 12 EVA adopters were then excluded from the sample 
because of the unavailability of price/return information and accounting data, leaving a final 
sample of 89 EVA adopters on NASDAQ, NYSE and American Stock Exchange Markets.  
Table 1 shows the pattern of EVA adoption and reveals that most EVA adoption took place in 
the period 1993-1997. The frequency of adoption increased up to 1996 and then started 
decreasing afterwards. This decline may be indicative of market saturation in the demand for 
EVA-based compensation contracts. Table A1 in the appendix provides the full list of EVA-
adopting firms, the year of adoption, the matching control firms and the SIC codes of these 
firms respectively.  
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                            
2 Source: United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. 2059. RR Donnelley & Sons 
Co, FORM 10-Q, May 7th 1997. 
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Financial and accounting data on these firms were then collected from the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT databases. The firm data used in this 
paper were extracted from balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements. The 
dependent variables are similar to those of Wallace (1997) and are defined as follows: 
- Dispositions: sale of plant, property and equipment (SPPE).3 
- New investment: acquisitions (AQC) plus capital expenditures (CAPX). 
- Repurchases per share: repurchases of common stock (PRSTKCC) divided by 
common shares outstanding (CSHO). 
- Dividends per share: dividend available to common shareholders (DVC) divided by 
common shares outstanding (CSHO). 
- Assets turnover: revenue (REVT) divided by average total assets (TA). 
- Inventory turnover: cost of goods sold (COGS) divided by average inventory (INVT). 
- Accounts receivable turnover: revenue (REVT) divided by average accounts 
receivable (AR). 
- Accounts payable turnover: cost of goods sold (COGS) divided by average accounts 
payable (AP). 
- ∆Leverage: changes in debt for firms between periods to total assets 
In order to control for the size effects through the analysis process all the dependent variables 
of this research are deflated by the initial total assets (TA) and used in levels rather than 
differences. 
3.2. Model considerations 
                                                            
3 Abbreviation between brackets stands for COMPUSTAT Mnemonic. 
Page 9 of 35 Accounting Research Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting Research Journal
10 
 
Empirical results are sensitive to the choice of the econometric model and variable 
measurement. In an event study, where the interest lies in assessing the impact of a particular 
event (in our case, the event is the adoption of EVA), three critical questions need to be 
answered: (i) How do we measure abnormal performance? (ii) What metric should we use for 
the empirical model? (iii) What is the appropriate statistical model? 
Assessing abn rmal performance is tricky, and care should be taken in adopting definitions of 
abnormal performance that avoid misspecification. Wallace (1997) and Balachandran (2006), 
for example, define abnormal performance as the difference of an accounting variable before 
and after adoption. This implicitly uses the firm as its own benchmark or control firm. 
However, this would lead to the omission of relevant firm, market or industry effects, and this 
in turn can confound the interpretation of empirical results. Barber and Lyon (1997) favour 
the use of control firms in calculating abnormal performance. The use of a control firm 
alleviates the problems of the misspecification because a similar firm provides good proxies 
for the firm, industry and market effects. Although Wallace (1997) does use control firms, he 
does not contrast them with the treatment (or adopter) firms. Instead, he uses the control firms 
alongside the treatment firms. Below, we rectify this shortcoming by modifying Wallace’s 
model to contrast each treatment firm with its own control firm. 
Control firms as selected similar to Wallace (1997). We first determine the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code of adopter companies using the CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases.  We then select a sample of the best matched control firms that closely resemble 
the adopter firm. The selection processes for control firms are based on the following criteria: 
1. Same industry sector: the sample firm should have the same 4-digits SIC code. If not, 
we chose the best matched firm with 3-digits SIC code. 
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2. Same firm size: we use total assets and number of outstanding common shares in the 
year prior to the year of adoption to match adopters and control firms. 
3. Data availability: the control firm should have sufficient annual data to match that of 
the adopting firm.  
4. Crosscheck: once the above conditions have been met, we check Lexis-Nexis, the 
Proxy Statement, the 10-Q report and the Wall Street Journal to ensure that the firm in 
question has not adopted EVA or RI compensation scheme. Otherwise, we select the 
next available firm. 
The second question relating to the choice of metric for the empirical model is more 
controversial. Various papers have analyzed the conceptual advantages and disadvantages of 
price and return models. Gonedes and Dopuch (1974) claim that return models theoretically 
outperform price models in the absence of well-developed theories of valuation. Lev and 
Ohlson (1982) consider the two methods as complementary, whereas Landsman and Magliolo 
(1988) argue that for specific applications price models are superior to return models. Christie 
(1987) concludes that while return and price models are economically the same, return models 
are econometrically less problematic.  
The empirical results of Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) confirm that the earnings’ response 
coefficients of the price models are less biased. However, return models have less serious 
econometric difficulties than price models. In some research contexts the combined use of 
both price and return models may be useful and seems to be the best course of action to take. 
In our context, the question is whether we should use levels or differences of financial 
variables. In principle, the empirical model should reflect an underlying true or theoretical 
model. If a model or a hypothesis predicts an effect on value (price; level) then the most 
logical conclusion would be to model value as a dependent variable rather than growth 
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(return; difference). While sometimes statistical considerations such as stationarity make it 
impossible to model levels directly, this is usually true for time series regressions and not 
cross sectional regressions. Thus, we contend that whenever there are no statistical 
impediments, an empirical model should reflect the basic theoretical models or hypothesis. 
Below, we argue that a model in levels better reflects the basic hypothesis and produces more 
robust statistical results. 
The third question on the appropriate statistical model is also important in that it helps us 
avoid spurious results. We do not wish to find ‘significant’ effects when in fact there are 
none, and vice versa. Thus, it is important that the empirical model is properly specified. 
Apart from the variables of interest (the dependent and independent variables), the model 
should also include other relevant control variables. Ignoring these control variables biases 
estimation results and may lead to spurious statistical conclusions. One important 
modification to Wallace’s model we propose is to replace the change in stock ownership of 
the top management and board of directors by a stock market return index. We argue that the 
former is an endogenous variable and is therefore correlated with the error term, which biases 
the estimated coefficients. We also use an alternative specification that uses abnormal 
measures of both dependent and independent variables.  
To address the above questions, we start from Wallace (1997) as a base model. Wallace 
(1997) used a sample of 40 firms that adopted RI-based compensation plans to test whether 
the adoption of the RI metric would influence the action of these firms compared to the action 
of other selected firms using traditional accounting-based compensation plans. His approach 
is therefore based on contrasting the adopters, which he calls the treatment firms, with the 
non-adopters, which he calls the control firms. The period of investigation extends to five 
years prior to the adoption, and up to three years following the adoption date (event date). 
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In the next subsection, we present an alternative model that can more sensibly capture 
potential differences between adopters and non-adopters.  
3.3. An Alternative Model  
Wallace (1997) uses the difference in variables between the pre- and post-adoption years for 
all firms. To test for potential adoption effect, he runs the following regression 
∆
 =  +  + ∆ + 	∆ +          (1) 
where ∆  refers to the difference between the average of a particular variable before the 
adoption date and the average of the same variables after (and including) the adoption year, 
and the index # refers to both treatment and control firms. ∆
 is the change in the 
variable of interest (e.g., share repurchases and residual income) for firm i between periods. 
 is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 for RI-based compensation adopting firms 
and 0 for non-adopting matching firms. 	 is defined as debt divided by total assets 
in each period. Finally,  refers to stock ownership of the top management and board of 
directors. Adoption of RI-based compensation is deemed to have an effect if β  is 
significantly different from zero (the average adopter and non-adopter have different means).  
While the above regression appears to make sense its main drawback is the implicit 
assumption that both adopters and non-adopters have identical sensitivity to the control 
variables. For example, treatment firms may have a different sensitivity to leverage (for 
instance, because they have a different size) and thus their coefficient may be different from 
. Thus, the above model is potentially misspecified and could consequently lead to a biased 
estimate of . 
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We propose an alternative model which directly contrasts the treatment and control firms’ 
performances. Define the average abnormal performance (%&) in the post-adoption period as  
%&'
( = 

( − 
,+,-.,/
(  
and the pre-adoption period as: 
%&'
 = 

 − 
,+,-.,/
  
the pre-adoption (post) period is referred to by superscripting variables with a minus (plus) 
sign. 

(/
 is some performance or accounting variable for treatment firm # , whereas  

,+,-.,/
(/
 is the same variable for a matching firm for treatment firm #. 
There are two main advantages to this approach. First, this specification allows both 
difference (return) and level (price) measures. The reason for this advantage is that what 
matters here is the difference between a treatment firm and a matching firm. Assuming the 
control firm is a perfect match, then the difference before the event (%&'
) should be close 
to zero, while the difference after the event (%&'
() should be different from zero under the 
hypothesis that the event has a significant effect.  
The second advantage is more important. For less than perfect control firms, there are 
differences in performance both before and after. For example, if the closest matching firm to 
a given treatment firm is half its size, we would expect, for example, its value to be roughly 
half. So the abnormal measure before adoption (%&'
 ) should be positive. However, 
adoption effect can still be identified, because in the absence of any effect, there should be no 
difference between %&'
 and %&'
( regardless of whether each of them is different from 
zero.  
The basic model that captures the adoption effect is given by 
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%&'
( =  + %&'
 +  
The parameter of interest is	, and the null hypothesis of no effect is	12:	 = 1 (i.e. the 
difference between treatment and control firm is unchanged). 
Since abnormal performance could also be the result of changes in other firm characteristics, 
we need additional control variables to improve the specification of the regression model. 
We use total assets and debt as control variables. Define abnormal assets and abnormal debt 
as the difference between the assets and debts between the treatment and control firms, 
respectively. That is, 
%&%
( = %
( − %,+,-.,/
(  
and   
%&
&
( = 
&
( − 
&,+,-.,/
(  
The full model is then given by 
%&'
( =  + %&'
 + %&%
( + %&
&
( +  
If there is no effect resulting from the adoption, then the abnormal performance before the 
event should be equal on average to the abnormal performance after the event. Any possible 
change in abnormal performance could be due to the control variables (abnormal TA and 
abnormal debt). Under the null hypothesis of no effect  = 1 . However, we can 
operationalize testing this hypothesis by subtracting %&'
 from both sides of the equation to 
obtain 
%&'
( − %&'
 =  + 4%&'
 + %&%
( + %&
&
( + 									(2) 
where  4 =  − 1. Thus, testing 12:	 = 1 is equivalent to testing	12:	4 = 0. 
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4. Empirical Results  
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the investigated potential investment decisions (the 
dependent and independent/control variables employed in model (2)). All dependent variables 
have been winsorised at the 99th percentile to remove outliers. The mean values of disposition 
per share are $26.191 million and $21.596 million for firms adopting EVA-based 
compensation and control firms respectively. Reflecting overall expectations of negative 
disposition per share after EVA adoption, in particular standard deviation, for matching firms 
(control firms) is higher than the corresponding adopting firms. Interestingly, the mean new 
investment is $285.998 million for adopting firms, whereas the mean new investment is 
$251.002 million for matching firms, which indicates that adopting firms operate with a 
considerably greater balance of new investment. Both adopter firms and matched firms 
operate with considerable leverage levels, although adopters have, again, greater levels. 
Moreover, all dependent variables appear to have a highly right-skewed distribution, as 
indicated by the large standard deviations. Overall, except for inventory turnover, the average 
level of both dependent and independent variables is greater for our sample of adopting firms.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 shows the results obtained for two investing decisions. The models explain a fairly 
good proportion of variability in abnormal dispositions and abnormal new investments (the 
adjusted-6 are 34.01% and 51.04% respectively). As discussed earlier,	4 the coefficient of 
lagged performance (%&'
) is the parameter of interest and we are testing for the null 
hypothesis that there is no effect (12:	4 = 0) of adoption on firm performance. The result 
shows that we fail to reject the null hypothesis for dispositions, so the adoption of EVA-based 
compensation, contrary to Wallace (1997), has not changed the disposition of assets. The 
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growth or decline in abnormal dispositions is mostly explained by the differential size and 
differential leverage. In the first case, the coefficient of %&%
(	equals 0.003 and is highly 
significant, implying that the increase (decrease) in dispositions is partly explained by the 
greater (smaller) size of the treatment firm relative to the control firm. On the other hand, 
more (less) leveraged firms have decreased (increased) their dispositions relative to non-
adopters (the coefficient of %&
&
(	is -0.024 and significant at the 1% level).  
On the other hand, we reject the null hypothesis that there are no effects of adoption on new 
investment decisions. The coefficient of lagged abnormal new investment,	δ equals -0.679 
and is highly significant at a p-value of less than 0.001. This is clear evidence showing that 
abnormal new investment has decreased significantly after adoption. This result is much 
stronger statistically than Wallace’s negative impact which is found to be weakly significant 
with a p-value of 0.09. Our results are also contrary to Balachandran (2006) and Kleiman 
(1999) who find no significant change in investment patterns. The control variables are also 
significant. First, like dispositions, abnormal size has a positive impact on new investments. 
This is expected since larger firms have greater ability to invest in absolute terms. However, 
unlike dispositions, abnormal leverage has a significant but positive coefficient. This implies 
that high leverage firms have a greater increase in new investments compared with lower 
leverage firms. 
Table 4 shows the results for financing decision. The adjusted-6 is very high for dividends 
(=75%) and reasonably high for repurchases (=20.12%).4 Thus, the models explain a good 
proportion of variability in abnormal repurchases and abnormal dividends. The coefficient of 
lagged performance, 4, is the parameter of interest. Contrary to Wallace (1997), the results 
show a fall in abnormal repurchases and dividends. The null hypotheses (1,: 4 ≠ 0) for 
                                                            
4 Wallace (1997) models exhibit very low adjusted-6. For example he finds an adjusted-6 of 8% for 
repurchases and a negative one for dividends. 
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repurchases and dividends are strongly rejected; both coefficients (-0.591 and -0.568 
respectively) are significant and negative, implying a reversal of the effect found in Wallace 
(1997). Thus, contrary to Wallace, our results suggest managers decrease share repurchases 
following adoption. Furthermore, while EVA-RI adoption has no effect on dividends in 
Wallace (1997), this study finds a strong and negative effect. This implies that managers of 
EVA adopted firms are reluctant to use free cash flows for both repurchases and dividend 
payouts relative to non-EVA adopters. There is no size or leverage effect as both control 
variables are insignificant in repurchases and dividends. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 5 shows the results for four operating decisions, namely asset turnover, inventory 
turnover, AR turnover and AP turnover. Three of the four estimated models explain a high 
proportion of variability in abnormal asset turnover, inventory turnover, and AP turnover (the 
adjusted-6 are 52.23%, 11.66%, and 29.34% respectively). The AR turnover has a lower 
adjusted-6 (5.30%). As discussed earlier, 4, the coefficient of lagged performance (%&'
) 
is the parameter of interest and we are testing for the null hypothesis that there is no effect 
(12: 4 = 0) of EVA adoption on firm performance. The results suggest strong rejection of 
the null hypotheses for all turnovers. So the adoption of EVA has affected the operating 
decisions the managers take in regard of turnovers. The effects are similar for all turnovers. In 
these operating decision variables, none of the control variables is significant. The 
coefficients of the lagged performance (%'
) in all cases are negative and highly significant. 
This suggests that these turnovers are significantly reduced after the adoption of EVA 
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compared with matching control firms. The biggest reduction is in asset turnover (coefficient 
= -0.474). Wallace (1997), on the other hand, finds a small positive, but significant, impact on 
asset turnover. The smallest, but still highly significant, impact we find is on AR turnover 
(coefficient=-0.199). Wallace (1997) finds a large and positive effect of EVA adoption on AR 
turnover. However, this effect in his study is only significant at the 10% level. The turnover 
reductions in inventory and AP are important and highly significant. This is in contrast to 
Wallace (1997) who finds no effect on these two turnovers. Overall, our results show a 
significant increase in the working capital cycle after adoption of EVA, implying that firm 
managers tend to increase profitability following adoption of an EVA based compensation 
plan under Wallace’s assumption focusing on denominators of turnover ratios. 
[Table 5 about here] 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we have re-examined the long-term effects of adopting economic value added 
(EVA) as a compensation tool. Our starting point is the seminal work of Wallace (1997) who 
uses a set of decisions that are expected to increase firm value and shareholder wealth. These 
are investing decisions (asset disposition and new investment decisions), financing decisions 
(share repurchase and dividends decisions) and operating decisions (asset turnover, inventory 
turnover, AR turnover and AP turnover). In theory, managers in adopting firms would 
increase asset disposition and turnover, share repurchases, dividends, inventory turnover and 
accounts receivable turnover, and decrease new investment and accounts payable turnover 
(Wallace, 1997). 
Our findings are summarised in Table 6. The table shows two sets of results. The first set 
summarises Wallace’s results. Although Wallace (1997) claims that 5 out of the 8 
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performances are significant, only 3 are significant at the 5% level (and only 1 is significant at 
the 1% level). More importantly, all results in Wallace (1997) have low or even negative 
adjusted	6 . This casts doubt on the inferential validity of his results as the regressions 
explain little or no variation. For example, although repurchases are found to increase after 
adoption with a highly significant coefficient, the 6suggests that only 8% of the variability 
of repurchases is explained by the model.  
Our proposed model offers mostly different conclusions. First we note the strength of our 
results. All our test results indicating a strong impact of EVA adoption are significant at the 
1% level and all but two results are associated with high adjusted	6. Only one of Wallace’s 
conclusions is consistent with our results, i.e. the new investment (although the significance 
level in Wallace (1997) is only 9% and matched with an adjusted 6  of 1%). The new 
investment was predicted and found to be negative by Wallace (1997), and this study is in line 
with that finding. An explanation of the strong and negative impact of EVA adoption on new 
investment might include the possibility that, when adopting EVA as a compensation plan and 
management tool, the criterion managers use to choose among alternative investments 
(projects) change, in such a way that the selected new investments have the ability to earn 
more than the embedded cost of debt financing. Thus, in order to increase firm value by 
generating more (above normal) earnings, managers will avoid over-investing, particularly in 
those investments that might earn less than the opportunity cost of capital and become 
reluctant to use free cash flows for new investments after adoption of EVA. However, we can 
also argue that a reduction in the new investment may lead to generate less revenue in the 
long term, and therefore reducing AR turnover, which is evident from our results in Table 6.  
In the remaining seven variables, there is no agreement with Wallace (1997). While he finds a 
positive effect for dispositions, this study finds no significant effect. A possible reason for this 
discrepancy might be referred to the nature of the assets adopter firm owned and to the 
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attractiveness of these assets to other companies. Some outside firms may believe that the 
adopter firm assets are in the most efficient user’s hand, and may be willing to offer a price 
that is high enough to tempt the adopter firm to sell the asset. However, it is also possible that 
other firms may believe the opposite. One other possibility could be that EVA adopters are 
reluctant to make investments, and therefore there is no incentive for managers to dispose 
existing assets because disposals without replacement might damage the ability of profit 
generation. The result of this study is consistent with a mixed response by firms such that 
some adopter firms increased their dispositions while others decreased them. The insignificant 
results suggest that the two effects cancel out.  
Wallace (1997) finds a positive effect for repurchases and no effect for dividends. We find a 
negative impact for both variables. A possible reason is that managers, in order to maximize 
their own utility, start retaining free cash flows. The retention is possibly employed as a 
means to insulate the firm from capital market scrutiny by avoiding extra capital needs. To 
avoid capital market monitoring, manager will only use the existing cash reserves that have 
been accumulated to finance new projects rather than paying it out to shareholders (Jensen, 
1993). A possibly more interesting reason for managers to avoid paying out cash flow is the 
desire to maximize the firm size.5 Further, managers have more tendencies toward preventing 
shareholders from getting more cash to refrain them from redirecting capital to a more 
productive use. Moreover, firms are reluctant to increase dividend payment particularly when 
they are unsure about the availability of futures free cash flows and whether they can sustain 
the same payout ratio (dividends are sticky). Firms are also more likely to prefer to finance 
share repurchases from the excess cash they generate from non-recurring items rather than 
using the free cash flow they generate from core activities (Miller & Rock, 1985). However, 
the stated purpose of the long-term incentives scheme is to align the interests of managers 
                                                            
5 Murphy (1985) documents a positive correlation between total management compensation and firm size. 
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with that of shareholders. To the extent that these long-term compensation plans encourage 
managers to develop growth opportunities, a significant fall in dividends (relative to control 
firms) can only be accepted if it is accompanied by a significant increase in new investments. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Both new investments and dividends/repurchases have 
fallen in relative terms. However, there can be a contrary argument that managers are highly 
motivated to reduce payouts after the adoption of EVA, because retained free cash flow would 
increase shareholders’ equity of the firm and may lead to decrease in weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC). This strategy would reduce the total cost for capital and maximise 
managers’ own interest.  
The measures of turnovers (asset, inventory, accounts receivable, and accounts payable) are 
all highly significant and negative, suggesting potential decreases in the working capital 
cycle. All turnovers decline after the adoption of EVA as a performance measure. Wallace 
(1997) found two positive (asset turnover and accounts payable turnover) and two 
insignificant (inventory turnover and accounts payable turnover) effects. Thus, our results 
disagree with Wallace (1997) in all four cases. 
We find that total asset turnover is significant and negative, which is consistent with the 
payout and new investment policies of EVA adopters. Lower revenue due to less new 
investments and higher total assets from retaining free cash flow would lead to slowing down 
the asset turnover ratio. If we focus on the denominator in each turnover ratio we expect a 
decrease in assets, inventory and AR, but an increase in AP following adoption; which helps 
the manager to increase operating cash flows as well as the utilisation level of net working 
capital. Our results provide a strong support for the expectations in AP turnover, which 
implies a possible increase in AP after the adoption of EVA. However, we find significant but 
negative signs in inventory turnover and AR turnover which are contrary to the expected 
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direction. Our empirical findings imply that the results are ambiguous, which can be observed 
from the adjusted-6statistic. Whenever effects are predicted to be ambiguous (e.g. Inventory 
turnover and AR turnover) the adjusted-6is low. Our test results suggest that inventory may 
go down slower than cost of sales after the adoption of EVA. Furthermore, revenue may 
decrease faster than AR according to our test results. These negative results highlight that the 
EVA adoption provides more incentives to reduce the total cost for capital through retention 
of free cash flow, rather than increasing operations and maximising shareholder wealth. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Overall, our results show that EVA adopters relative to non-EVA adopters (a) increase the 
working capital cycle (b) use their assets less intensively, and (c) decrease their payouts to 
shareholders via a decrease in dividends and share repurchases. We only agree with Wallace 
(1997) on one case, namely that EVA adopters decrease their new investments. His 
significant and positive effect on dispositions is insignificant in our model. In the remaining 
six business decisions, Wallace finds three significant positive effects and three insignificant 
effects. All six decisions are significant but negative in our case.  
While our proposed model seems more appropriate in terms of specification, the results it 
offers are mostly contrary to expectation. Thus, our study re-opens the debate as to whether 
EVA adoption leads to better or worse performance.  
Our study has both empirical and practical implications. Empirically, more elaborate 
simulation studies may be required to establish the performance of matching and non-
matching models. Empirically, the results may be sensitive to several factors. First, it is 
possible that an important factor is missing from the model. The models in this study use size 
and leverage as firm characteristics and stock market return as a market wide control factor. 
Other characteristics such as firm age and industry may be influential. Second, the matching 
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procedure may not produce accurate benchmarks. Following previous studies, the SIC code 
was used here to match treatment and control firms. This can possibly be improved by 
increasing the number of matching characteristics to include firm characteristics such as size, 
leverage and systematic risk (beta).  
One obvious practical implication of this study is that tying managers with one particular 
performance metric may not necessarily lead to a single outcome. This is similar to the 
conflicting alignment-entrenchment effect of executive share-ownership discussed by Khan 
and Mather (2013). Another implication of the above results is that the adoption of EVA, at 
least in our US sample, does not generally lead to its desired effect. In particular, managers 
that are compensated on an EVA basis tend to maximise cash flow rather than shareholder 
wealth. Firms should therefore focus more on the quality of the remuneration committee 
(Cubinski and Windsor, 2013) as well as the characteristics of the board of directors (Gray 
and Nowland, in press). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. EVA Adopting Companies 1987-2001(USA) 
No. Sample Company 
Adoption 
Year 
Control Company SIC Code 
1 COCA COLA 1987 PEPSICO INC 2080 
2 CSX CORPORATION 1988 SANTA FE FINANCIAL CORP 6711 
3 CILCORP 1989 ALLETE INC 4931 
4 CRANE CO 1990 WHITTAKER CORP 3490/3494 
5 BRIGGS & STRATTON 1990 STEWART & STEVENSON SVCS INC 3510/3519 
6 QUAKER OATS 1991 RALSTON PURINA CO 2040/2043 
7 BALL CORP 1992 CROWN HOLDINGS INC 3221 
8 WHIRLPOOL CORP 1992 AKTIEBOLAGET ELECTROLUX 3630 
9 AT&T 1992 G T E CORP 4813 
10 Scherer, R.P. 1992 FOREST LABS INC 2834 
11 WELLMAN 1993 ASHLAND INC NEW 2824 
12 Grainger, W.W. 1993 WAXMAN INDUSTRIES INC 5063 
13 MANITOWOC CO 1993 ASTEC INDUSTRIES INC 3531 
14 Digital Equipment Corp. 1993 APPLE INC 3573 
15 FURON CORP. 1993 WYNNS INTERNATIONAL INC 3079 
16 Harnischfeger Ind. Inc.  1993 APPLIED MATERIALS INC 3536 
17 Hewlett Packard Co. 1993 HITACHI LIMITED 3571 
18 Ruby Tuesday Inc.  1993 
WORLDWIDE RESTAURANT 
CNCPTS INC 
5812 
19 Smith International Inc.  1993 CABOT CORP 3533 
20 Transamerica Corp. 1993 LOEWS CORP 6711 
21 ACXIOM CORP 1994 MCGRAW HILL COS INC 7370 
22 BOISE CASCADE CORP 1994 BT OFFICE PRODUCTS INTL INC 2421 
23 FLEMING COMPANIES INC 1994 NASH FINCH COMPANY 5141 
24 GEORGIAPACIFIC GROUP 1994 WEYERHAEUSER CO 2435 
25 LILLY (ELI) & CO 1994 WYETH 2834 
26 SPRINT FON GROUP 1994 CENTEL CORP 4813 
27 CENTURA BANKS INC 1994 AMERICAN FLETCHER CORP 6036 
28 Core Industries Inc.  1994 WHITTAKER CORP 3429 
29 Deere & Co.  1994 KUBOTA CORP 3523 
30 Eastman Chemical Co.  1994 ROHM & HAAS CO 3861 
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Table A1 continued. 
No. Sample Company 
Adoption 
Year 
Control Company SIC Code 
31 Gencorp Inc. 1994 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 3011 
32 Incstar Corp. 1994 A M A G PHARMACEUTICALS INC 2830 
33 Insteel Industries 1994 NATIONAL STANDARD CO 3310 
34 Ohio Edison Co. 1994 NORTHEAST UTILITIES 4911 
35 Reynolds Metals Co.  1994 KAISERTECH LTD 3353 
36 Tenneco Inc.  1994 CHAMPION PARTS INC 3714 
37 Wallace Computer Services  1994 MOORE WALLACE INC 2761 
38 ZOLTEK Cos. Inc.  1994 WOODWARD INC 3620 
39 ARMSTRONG HOLDINGS INC 1995 NEWELL RUBBERMAID INC 2511 
40 BARD (C.R.) 1995 TELEFLEX INC 5086 
41 PERKINELMER INC 1995 BIO RAD LABORATORIES INC 3823 
42 SPX CORP 1995 GIDDINGS & LEWIS INC WIS 3540 
43 American Precision Ind.  1995 FRANKLIN ELECTRIC INC 3443 
44 Armstrong World Industries Inc.  1995 E G & G INC (VISKASE COMPANIES) 2511 
45 Beckman Instruments Inc. 1995 PERKINELMER INC 5311 
46 Emerson Electric Co.  1995 PANASONIC CORP 3621/3823 
47 IPALCO Enterprises Inc.  1995 Tucson /U N S ENERGY CORP 4911 
48 KAISER ALlUMINUM Corp.  1995 MAXXAM INC 3334 
49 Knight–Ridder Inc. 1995 NEW YORK TIMES CO 2711 
50 New Jersey Resources  1995 ATMOS ENERGY CORP 4924 
51 Sequent Computer  1995 STRATUS COMPUTER INC 3570 
52 ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC 1996 TELLABS INC 3679 
53 BAUSCH & LOMB INC 1996 CHIRON CORP 3861 
54 BECTON DICKINSON & CO 1996 BARD C R INC 3841 
55 DONNELLEY (R R) & SONS CO 1996 BOWNE & CO INC 3229 
56 GUIDANT CORP 1996 MEDTRONIC INC 3841 
57 KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT 1996 C M P GROUP INC 4911 
58 OLIN CORP 1996 F M C CORP 2810 
59 SILICON VY BANCSHARES 1996 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 6022/6710 
60 TUPPERWARE CORP 1996 ENVIRODYNE INDUSTRIES INC 3089 
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Table A1 continued. 
No. Sample Company 
Adoption 
Year 
Control Company SIC Code 
61  MILLER HERMAN 1996 H N I CORP 2531 
62 Cincinnati Milacron  1996 KENNAMETAL INC 3541 
63 HACH Co.  1996 COHERENT INC 3820 
64 KLLM Transport Services 1996 MATLACK SYSTEMS INC 4210 
65 NEW ENGLAND BUSINESS SERVICES 1996 ENNIS INC 2761 
66 Quaker State  1996 TESORO CORP 2911 
67 STRATTEC SECURITY CORP  1996 F M C CORP 8740 
68 TEKTRONIX 1996 SNAP ON INC 3825 
69 CDI CORP  1997 ROBERT HALF INTL INC 3269 
70 GC COMPANIES INC 1997 MARCUS CORP 7830 
71 JOHNSON OUTDOORS INC   1997 ELECTRO SCIENTIFIC INDS INC 3940 
72 MILLENNIUM CHEMICALS INC 1997 BIG THREE INDS INC 2813 
73 PHARMACIA CORP 1997 BAUSCH & LOMB INC 2823 
74 RYDER SYSTEM INC 1997 ROLLINS TRUCK LEASING CORP 6159 
75 TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 1997 UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES INC 8062 
76 WEBSTER FINL CRP WATERBURY 1997 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 6035 
77 FEDERALMOGUL CORP 1998 DANA HOLDING CORP 3562 
78 MATERIAL SCIENCES CORP 1998 SHAW GROUP INC 3470 
79 MONTANA POWER CO 1998 C H ENERGY GROUP INC 4911 
80 PENNEY (J C) CO 1998 DILLARDS INC 5311 
81 STANDARD MOTOR PRODS 1998 HARBINGER GROUP INC 3694 
82 BRADLEY PHARMACEUTICALS 1998 BALCHEM CORP 2830/5120 
83 BEST BUY CO INC 1998 RADIOSHACK CORP 5732 
84 INTERNATIONAL MULTIFOODS  1999 RALSTON PURINA CO 2041 
85 TOYS R US INC 1999 MICHAELS STORES INC 6711 
86 GENESCO 1999 FOOT LOCKER INC 2341 
87 MOLSON COORS 1999 ANHEUSER BUSCH COS INC 2082 
88 SCHNITZER STEEL 2000 ENVIROSOURCE INC 3310 
89 HARSCO 2001 DYNAMIC MATERIALS CORP 3446 
Source: Wallace (1997), Kleiman (1999), Stern Stewart & Co. brochure, Lexis-Nexis, Proxy 
Statement and 10-Q report and Wall Street Journal. 
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Table 1. EVA Adoption over Time 
Year 
Number 
of Adopter 
Percent 
of sample 
Cumulative 
percent of sample 
1987 1 1.12 1.12 
1988 1 1.12 2.25 
1989 1 1.12 3.37 
1990 2 2.25 5.62 
1991 1 1.12 6.74 
1992 4 4.49 11.24 
1993 10 11.24 22.47 
1994 18 20.22 42.70 
1995 13 14.61 57.30 
1996 17 19.10 76.40 
1997 8 8.99 85.39 
1998 7 7.87 93.26 
1999 4 4.49 97.75 
2000 1 1.12 98.88 
2001 1 1.12 100.00 
Total 89 100% 100% 
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 Table 2. Selected descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables 
Variables 
Adopter (Treatment) Firms Control Firms 
N Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
N Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Disposition* 1933 26.191 83.678 2083 21.596 81.719 
New Investment* 3411 285.998 698.578 3453 251.002 632.354 
Repurchases per share 3464 0.477 1.204 3585 0.453 1.268 
Dividends per share 3441 0.89 1.061 3573 0.857 1.466 
Asset Turnover 3331 1.298 0.808 3555 1.199 0.763 
Inventory Turnover 3206 9.148 13.164 3417 9.784 14.041 
AR Turnover 3245 10.022 12.165 3425 9.895 14.035 
AP Turnover 2886 11.551 7.483 3186 11.119 6.729 
Debt* 3423 1930.364 5704.894 3628 1846.283 5582.607 
* These variables are in $ million. Statistics are based on annual accounting data available from 1960 to 
2012. Sample sizes represent firm-years. Disposition is the sale of plant, property and equipment. New 
investment is acquisitions plus capital expenditures. Purchases per share are ($) purchases of common stock 
divided by Common Shares Outstanding. Dividends are dividends (in $) available to common shareholders 
divided by Common Shares Outstanding. Assets turnover is revenue divided by average total assets. 
Inventory turnover is calculated as cost of goods sold divided by average inventory. Accounts Receivable 
(AR) Turnover is defined as revenue divided by average accounts receivable. Accounts Payable (AP) 
Turnover is the cost of goods sold divided by average accounts payable, and Debt is the company’s total 
debt. All dependent variables are winsorised at the 99% percentile to remove potential outlier effect. 
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Table 3. Investing Decisions 
 
Independent Variables 
%&'
( − %&'
 Constant %&'
 %&%
( %&
&
( ADJ- 6
 
 
Dispositions 
    
34.01% Coefficient -6.154 -0.009 0.003 -0.024 
t-statistics -0.878 -0.088 2.988 -4.653 
p-value 0.385 0.929 0.005 0.000 
New investment 
    
51.04% Coefficient 43.192 -0.679 0.017 0.055 
t-statistics 2.112 -8.177 4.375 3.935 
p-value 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Results reported for the regression: %&'
( − %&'
 =  + 4%&'
 + %&%
( + %&
&
( +  , 
where %&'
( is the abnormal performance after the adoption, %&'
 is the abnormal performance before the 
adoption, %&%
(  is the abnormal total asset after the adoption, %&
&
(  is the abnormal debt after the 
adoption and  is the error terms. Asset disposition and new investment are the dependent variables. 
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Table 4. Financing Decisions 
 
Independent Variables 
%&'
( − %&'
 Constant %&'
 %&%
( %&
&
( ADJ- 6 
Share Repurchases 
    
20.12% Coefficient 0.111 -0.591 -0.000 0.000 
t-statistics 0.925 -4.635 -0.174 0.368 
p-value 0.358 0.000 0.862 0.714 
Dividends 
    
75.00% Coefficient 0.037 -0.568 -0.000 0.000 
t-statistics 0.705 -14.854 -0.363 0.475 
p-value 0.483 0.000 0.717 0.636 
Results reported for the regression: %&'
( − %&'
 =  + 4%&'
 + %&%
( + %&
&
( +  , 
where %&'
( is the abnormal performance after the adoption, %&'
 is the abnormal performance before the 
adoption, %&%
(  is the abnormal total asset after the adoption, %&
&
(  is the abnormal debt after the 
adoption and  is the error terms. Share repurchases and dividends are the dependent variables. 
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Table 5. Operating Decisions (New Model) 
 
Independent Variables 
%&'
( − %&'
 Constant %&'
 %&%
( %&
&
( ADJ- 6 
 
Asset Turnover 
    
52.23% 
Coefficient 0.046 -0.474 -0.000 -0.000 
t-statistics 1.232 -9.139 -0.054 -0.062 
p-value 0.222 0.000 0.957 0.537 
Inventory Turnover 
    
11.66% 
Coefficient 0.992 -0.450 -0.0002 -0.0001 
t-statistics 0.691 -2.927 -1.115 -0.0727 
p-value 0.491 0.004 0.268 0.942 
AR Turnover 
    
5.30% 
Coefficient 0.005 -0.199 -0.0000 0.0005 
t-statistics -0.006 -2.412 -0.351 0.893 
p-value 0.995 0.018 0.726 0.374 
AP Turnover 
    
29.34% 
Coefficient -1.073 -0.453 -0.00002 0.0001 
t-statistics -1.582 -5.687 -0.319 0.220 
p-value 0.118 0.000 0.750 0.826 
Results reported for the regression: %&'
( − %&'
 =  + 4%&'
 + %&%
( + %&
&
( +  , 
where %&'
( is the abnormal performance after the adoption, %&'
 is the abnormal performance before the 
adoption, %&%
(  is the abnormal total asset after the adoption, %&
&
(  is the abnormal debt after the 
adoption and  is the error terms. Turnovers are the dependent variables. 
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     Table 6. Summary of Results 
Variable  
(Predicted Sign) 
Wallace Model 
(p-val, ADJ- R) 
Our Model  
(p-val, ADJ- R) 
Dispositions (+) Positive (0.02,0.09)  nr (0.93,0.34) 
New investment (-) Negative (0.09,0.01) Negative (0.00,0.51) 
Repurchases (+) Positive (0.00,0.08) Negative (0.00,0.20) 
Dividends (+) Nr (0.26,-0.00) Negative (0.00,0.75) 
Asset Turnover (+) Positive (0.05,0.11) Negative (0.00,0.52) 
Inventory Turnover  (+) Nr (0.26,-0.03) Negative (0.00,0.11) 
AR Turnover (+) Positive (0.08,-0.01) Negative (0.02,0.05) 
AP Turnover (-) Nr(0.38,-0.04) Negative (0.00,0.29) 
(nr) means no significant relationship.  
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